HPG Pays Tribute to Guerrillas Doğa Şîn and Eylül Deniz Zagros

The People’s Defense Forces (HPG) paid tribute to Free Women’s Units (YJA Star) guerrillas Doğa Şîn and Eylül Deniz Zagros, who fell as martyrs in Turkish attacks on Gare.

According to the HPG, both fighters were involved in resistance in various regions of Kurdistan for years and sustained fatal injuries during two separate attacks in January and February. The HPG described them as “courageous and dedicated militants” who had devoted their lives to the struggle for Kurdish freedom.

The People’s Defense Forces expressed their condolences to the families of the two fallen fighters and emphasized in their obituary the emotional connection the women had with the ideals of the movement. They were honored as role models for the new generation of young activists. The loss, they said, is a heavy blow, but their legacy will live on, in political work, the fight for recognition and rights, and in the cultural memory of the Kurdish movement.

“Doğa and Eylül were not just militants; they were symbolic figures of a movement that stands against oppression and for a life of freedom,” the statement read. Their courage and determination made them role models beyond death. “We will continue their path with determination,” concluded the message.

Nom de Guerre: Doğa Şîn
Full name: Binevş Altay
Place of birth: Pirsûs
Mother and father’s names: Üveyş – Selami
Date and place of death: January 11, 2025 / Gare

Nom de Guerre: Eylül Deniz Zagros
Full name: Evin Işbilir
Place of birth: Gever
Mother and father’s names: Güzel – Halit
Date and place of death: February 1, 2025 / Gare

Doğa Şîn

Originally from the northern Kurdish town of Suruç (Pirsûs), Doğa Şîn grew up in a politicized environment and joined the guerrillas in 2014, amid the war against the Islamic State (ISIS). Her decision was made under the impression of the attack on the western Kurdish city of Kobanê, located directly across the border from Suruç. “She promised herself at that time to support the people who had lost their homes and to stand against what she saw as the cause of their suffering,” said the HPG.

Prior to that, Doğa Şîn had spent years searching for a way out of what she perceived as an alienating society. Her encounter with the ideology of Abdullah Öcalan, and especially his views on women and alternatives to the capitalist system, led her to the Kurdish freedom movement. After joining the guerrillas, she fought directly in areas where resistance against ISIS was taking place. Following an injury at the front and a lengthy recovery, she returned to active combat, this time in the mountains.

Despite coming from a flatland region, she quickly felt at home in the mountains. There, she was active in various organizational and military roles. With strong determination and tactical skill, she specialized in modern guerrilla warfare. Her comrades described her as a disciplined, creative, and reliable fighter who never shied away from challenges.

In one of her writings, Doğa Şîn described the mountains as motherly and protective, a metaphor for her journey of self-discovery. In her military operations, she reportedly stood out for her precision and dedication.

Eylül Deniz Zagros

Eylül Deniz Zagros was born in Yüksekova (Gever), in the northern Kurdish province of Hakkari (Colemêrg), a region known for its deeply rooted spirit of resistance. Her family had already been active in the Kurdish liberation struggle in previous years, which had a profound influence on her. As a teenager, she was involved in political activism, and from around 2009, she participated in organizing community self-defense. In 2012, she left university and joined the guerrillas in the Zagros Mountains.

She viewed her political and ideological training as the foundation for her later military education. According to her own accounts, her motivation was closely tied to the violent deaths of her brother and a paternal cousin in 2013 in Yüksekova. Both men were shot dead by snipers from a Turkish police special unit during a protest against the desecration of a guerrilla cemetery.

Her path in the guerrilla eventually led her into the fight against ISIS, including in the Yazidi region of Shengal, where a genocide occurred in 2014 and Yazidi women were systematically kidnapped and abused. She considered the suffering of Yazidi women as symbolic of patriarchal violence, which motivated her to resist with determination.

After several injuries, Eylül Deniz Zagros returned to the Medya Defense Areas, continued her training, and contributed to the development of new guerrilla tactics. According to the obituary, she placed great emphasis on collective responsibility, humility, and gender equality within the movement. She became a role model for many young women through her determination.

https://abolitionmedia.noblogs.org/?p=18180

The Emergence of the PKK in the 1970s – Part I

The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) emerged in the 1970s, in a period when freedoms were being suppressed across Turkey and Kurdistan, and Kurds were subjected to policies of annihilation and denial. Sowing its seeds during the 1973 Newroz and evolving into a political party in 1978 through a process of ideological consolidation, PKK claimed the legacy of revolutionary figures such as Deniz Gezmiş and Mahir Çayan. It launched a struggle of resurgence against social-chauvinism influenced by Kemalism, the Turkish occupation and colonialism in Kurdistan, and the local collaborating forces that supported them.

PKK emerged in Kurdistan as a radical and critical movement for freedom. In his book Defending the Kurds under the Grip of Cultural Genocide, Abdullah Ocalan—known within the movement as Leader Apo—describes the conditions in which the PKK was born. Recalling the moment he first used the phrase ‘colonized Kurdistan,’ he shares how deeply it affected him, both emotionally and physically: ‘‘The tremor that the concept of colonized Kurdistan caused in my mind and heart, followed by my fainting, was the first and only such episode in my life. At the time, I found it truly strange. But later developments would show why a single concept could carry such overwhelming weight. Even now, I find it difficult to explain the impact it had on me in those early days. To stand alone in Ankara and decide to initiate a conceptual awakening at a time when the death warrant for Kurdistan and Kurdishness had been declared—and was being executed in its most extreme form—would require an analysis profound enough to be the subject of a novel.’’

Mahir, Deniz and Ibrahim

Abdullah Ocalan recalls being part of both the Kurdish and Turkish revolutionary youth movements, and says he was deeply influenced by them. Reflecting on this formative period, Ocalan writes: ‘‘I had heard the names of the People’s Liberation Party-Front of Turkey (THKP-C), the People’s Liberation Army of Turkey (THKO), and the Communist Party of Turkey/Marxist–Leninist (TKP/ML-TIKKO), and I had witnessed the brave martyrdoms of their leaders. I saw with my own eyes how Mahir Çayan, the leader of THKP-C; Deniz Gezmiş, the leader of THKO; and Ibrahim Kaypakkaya, the leader of TIKKO, gave voice to the reality of the Kurdish people and the Kurdish nation—at the cost of their lives. Alongside many other factors that came later, the martyrdom of these leaders, who emerged from within the youth and sacrificed themselves for the sake of truth, was a decisive force that gave me the courage to walk toward my own authentic reality.’’

How will you make a piece of wood grow?

Ocalan (Leader Apo) drew attention to the disbelief and resistance he faced in the early days of political organizing by sharing a striking moment with a villager—an exchange that captured the atmosphere of those difficult years. Describing that period, he writes: ‘‘To live and move forward with a political concept based on just two words in the Turkey of the 1970s and 1980s was of immense significance. Each day passed like a leaden weight, heavier than years. The goal we were striving toward was more vague than a dream. Yet I was certain that even becoming a group was already a major achievement. It wasn’t hard to guess that our group activity—carried out right under the nose of the most capable intelligence officers—was not being taken seriously, even mocked and dismissed. It was just like what that villager said when I shared my first social experience—the realization that ‘we might be Kurds’: You’re trying to speak to a dry plank of wood. How are you going to make that piece of wood grow? It was clear they saw us with the same disbelief.’’

Ocalan explains that it took five years after forming as a group for them to find the courage to name themselves: ”Our earliest labels were given to us: ‘UKO supporters,’ ‘Apo supporters.’ It felt like an honor to be named, but those names were not of our own choosing. During the group period, the only name we could give ourselves was ‘Revolutionaries of Kurdistan.’ It took us five full years after forming as a group to finally gather the courage to name ourselves. What began near the banks of the Çubuk Dam in Ankara during the Newroz of 1973—a journey filled with passion and madness—culminated on November 27, 1978, in the village of Fis in Diyarbakır’s (Amed) Lice district, with the founding of PKK. It felt like we had redeemed our honor. What greater goal could there be? After all, the modern organization of the modern class structure had been established.”

Through these reflections, Ocalan reveals the historical and emotional depth of the founding of PKK, and how it became a revolutionary response to the denial and destruction imposed on the Kurdish people. In an era when even saying ‘I am a Kurd’ was forbidden, the emergence of the PKK marked a miraculous breakthrough. What began as a lifeline for a people targeted by cultural genocide eventually grew into a revolutionary movement that came to be embraced by other oppressed peoples as well—and continues its struggle for freedom to this day.

If not for real socialism

Ocalan notes that, from today’s vantage point, he can evaluate the intellectual and historical conditions that led to the founding of PKK with greater clarity. He continues his reflections as follows: ‘‘As we moved toward the founding of PKK, we were deeply committed to remaining faithful to the scientific socialist line of Marxism. Without real socialism, an organization like the PKK might never have come into being. However, that does not mean the PKK, in its early phase, was a fully formed real socialist organization. Although it was heavily influenced by real socialism, the PKK’s entire reality cannot be explained solely through that lens. To arrive at a more accurate interpretation, it is necessary to consider the concepts of relativity and difference. I still remember clearly—because of the subject-object dichotomy embedded in real socialism, I was constantly searching for a material basis for the PKK’s formation, trying to interpret everything through a materialist framework. This search became, for me, a kind of fundamental principle—something absolutely essential.

Toward a description of the PKK

The effort to reinterpret PKK today, Ocalan suggests, is only possible thanks to a philosophical transformation—one that avoids absolutizing the subject-object dichotomy and resists turning itself into an absolute framework. Within this perspective, rethinking the PKK involves identifying the global conditions and material-cultural elements it was grounded in during the early 1970s, as well as the dominant forms of consciousness, organization, action, and moral culture that shaped it. According to Ocalan, this process is essential not only for accurately defining the PKK Movement, but also for shedding greater light on its role in the present.’’

He notes that the counter-revolution of the 1970s emerged in direct response to the anti-modernist cultural revolution that had peaked in the 1968 uprisings. He warns against reducing the global shift of the 1970s to mere economic transformation, writing: ‘‘The rise of financial capital cannot be explained by the innocent mask of economic reform. Its dominance was built upon two world wars, the wars of the twentieth century—history’s bloodiest century—and even more deeply, on five centuries of class domination and colonial warfare. It all culminates in the power of the nation-state, which represents total war against society from top to bottom.”

Ocalan goes on to describe Turkey of the 1970s as a country increasingly shaped by both the revolutionary and counter-revolutionary waves sweeping the globe. He writes: ”Turkey could not avoid becoming part of this world, despite its efforts to shield itself behind thick ideological walls. The Youth Revolution of 1968, followed by the economic and military counter-revolutions of 1980—namely, the 24 January economic decisions and the 12 September military coup—ultimately dragged Turkey into this historical tide. The global crisis of the capitalist system manifested itself in Turkey as a crisis of White Turkish fascism. In essence, the crisis of capitalist modernity was the crisis of the Turkish nation-state.’’

The most extensive operation of Gladio: September 12

Abdullah Ocalan emphasizes that the military coups of 12 March 1971 and 12 September 1980 were carried out to crush revolutionary movements that civil fascist forces had failed to suppress. He writes: ‘‘The system’s most fortified bastion could only be protected through military coups, which were constantly reinforced by counter-revolutionary civilian fascist movements. Since 1925, the ‘White Turkish’ conspiratorial system has been at war with all forms of cultural existence and democratic stirrings that posed a threat to fascist modernity—especially the Kurdish identity. As this system became increasingly exposed and discredited, it also became more unhinged. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Gladio structure had the most powerful operational units. It had taken control of nearly all political formations. Whenever there was even a limited break from its grip, civil fascist forces would be mobilized; and when they proved insufficient, the entire military would be brought in. It played the role of a proto-Zionist system and was supported by global hegemonic powers because of that. There is no other example of a regime that exerted such total control over its own people.

This is why the crisis of ‘White Turkish’ modernity directly concerned the global system. The aim of the September 12 fascist coup was to overcome this crisis. Its core political strategies included opening the economy to global markets and integrating with the global financial system; and ideologically, shifting from secular nationalism toward a fusion of Turkish-Islamic nationalism—reinforcing the secular nation-state model with a Turkish-Islamic one. The September 12 coup was NATO Gladio’s most extensive operation. It was tasked with permanently suppressing the revolutionary and democratic actions of all peoples in the Middle East. To this day, it continues to pursue that mission, alongside the system’s civilian fascist networks and semi-military structures.’’

Reviving truths once thought dead

In the 1970s, real socialism entered a deep crisis and began shifting into a position that, rather than challenging the system, reinforced capitalist modernity. Unable to renew or reorganize itself, it faced ideological stagnation and eventual collapse. One of the states most shaken by this crisis was Turkey. The breakdown of White Turkish fascism began to surface ideologically, exposing it to the critique and resistance of emerging revolutionary forces. As Ocalan observed, the revolutionary movements of that period were deeply ideological. For the first time in Turkish history, suppressed social realities were being voiced through these movements. Truths once assumed to be dead were being revived. Islamist ideologies were losing ground to socialist-revolutionary currents, and the Kurdish reality was once again rising to the surface. Outside the PKK, most ideological and revolutionary movements of the era remained confined to the narrow actions of isolated groups. In this climate, it was only the PKK that succeeded in standing up against Turkish colonialism and launching a genuine revolutionary breakthrough.

Ocalan has stated that the foundational idea behind the PKK’s emergence was based on the model of state-building proposed by Joseph Stalin and later endorsed by Vladimir Lenin, particularly in the context of resolving the Kurdish question. However, one of the major ideological ambiguities the PKK faced during its formation stemmed from the nation-state model itself. Stalin’s principle—endorsed by Lenin—of granting nations the right to self-determination through the creation of a state had caused deep ideological confusion across global socialist and leftist movements. The PKK, too, was drawn into this confusion. It was only later that Ocalan would break from this paradigm. With his book Defending a People, he introduced a new framework—’Democratic, Ecological, and Women’s Liberationist Society’—marking the beginning of a new and more powerful phase of struggle.

source: ANF English

https://abolitionmedia.noblogs.org/?p=18031

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# NEWROZ PIROZ BE!

This week all Kurdistan went to the streets for Newroz, the new year celebrations for many peoples in West and Central Asia, Caucasus and Balkans. It has a very significant meaning of resistance for Kurdish people. Throughout northern Syria big celebrations were organized by the DAANES, with music, political speeches and other cultural events. Many political and social organizations made statements to celebrate Newroz and to celebrate the achievements of the Kurdish liberation movement, as well as the revolutionary steps taken this year, and the recent statement of Abdullah Öcalan invigorated the celebrations.

# NEXT STEPS ON THE AGREEMENTS SIGNED BY ABDI-SHARA'A

Following the agreements of cooperation signed by Mazlum Abdi and Ahmed al-Shara'a, the provisional goverment formed a committee to coordinate its implementation. Alongside discussions about the integration of SDF into the Ministry of defense and other topics related to security and military affairs, steps are also been taken in civilian affairs. UNICEF mediated a discussion between the DAANES and the Ministry of Education to develop a fair and accessible process for students across the region, mainly concerning Syrian universities and mechanisms for conducting secondary and preparatory certificate exams. Discussions about oil and gas fields and electricity plants are also taking place, with the Syrian Minister of Electricity Omar Shaqrouq giving at a press conference about energy infrastructure repairs in northeast Syria. Rumors and alleged conditions of SDF and the transitional government about the integration of SDF in the new Syrian army are spreading on some social networks, but as terms are being discussed no official announcements have been made this week.

# AGREEMENTS BETWEEN PYD AND ENKS

Representants of PYD (Partiya Yekitiya Democratic - Democratic Union Party, leading political party of DAANES) and ENKS (Kurdish national union party, a party in Rojava that is closely connected to KRG and Turkey) held a meeting in Qamishlo with mediation of Mazlum Abdi and American officials. After the meeting both sides communicated they reached agreements to end the disputes between both organizations and to build a common delegation to negotiate with the Damascus provisional government. Both parties also expressed their common disagreement with the provisional consitution that was recently proposed by the provisional government, calling for a decentralized and federal Syria. They also stated that they will meet again after the celebrations of Newroz to continue negotiations.

#COASTAL INSURGENCE

Incidents continue in the coastal areas of the Latakia province that saw the recent wave of insurgency. Revenge killings and kidnappings have continued over the past week, even as coordinated insurgent attacks and extrajudicial sectarian killings by interim government forces have decreased. Alawite media have widely reported on instances of violence committed against the Alawite community by Sunnis and government forces. Several thousands, mostly Alawites, left their homes seeking shelter from the attacks in Lebanon. Near 10.000 found temporary shelter in the Russian base at Hmeimim, but after the tensions lowered, Russian military personal urged them to leave the military base.

# CLASHES IN LEBANESE BORDER

After a confusing incident on the border between Syria and Lebanon where some Syrians were killed, clashes took place. Forces of HTS connected to the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) launched a raid into Lebanese territory, taking control of one small border town. The Lebanese army engaged in clashes, allegedly against smugglers or tribal armed groups. HTS-linked media blame Hezbollah for the incidents, but Hezbollah denied involvment. Over the week, clashes continued on and off, with discussions ongoing between Lebanese goverment and Syrian provisional government to secure the border and stop the clashes. Allegedly, Hezbollah used the tensions and confusion to launch raids on Syrian territory.

# DEIR EZZOR INSURGENCY

Soldiers of the MoD launched several raids in the Deir Ezzor region, in areas under control of the provisional government. The raids followed a wave of insurgency and attacks against military points of the MoD, allegedly by smuggling networks and militias aligned with Hezbollah or with Iran. It seems there is no direct relation between the insurgency in Deir Ezzor and the insurgency in coastal areas, but in both cases Assad loyalist elements seem to be involved in one way or another.

# HALT ON TURKISH ATTACKS?

On Sunday 16th of March a Turkish drone attacked a family home in the Kobane countryside killing both parents and 7 children, with only two children surviving with serious injuries. Many protests denouncing the attack took place all across north-east Syria. Two days after the massacre, the attacks of SNA and the Turkish army slowed down to a point that in the last days, no new attacks are reported. This pause could be a temporary phenomenon, but it comes against the backdrop of the SDF-Syrian provisional government talks. Turkey and the SNA appeared to halt attacks on March 19, which was the same day that the Syrian interim government met with the SDF at al Shaddadi base in Hasakah Province to continue negotiations over the SDF’s integration into the Syrian army.

# ISRAEL ATTACKS

Israel continued its attacks on Syrian military positions, further advancing their occupation in southern Syria. Some airstrikes are claimed to be targeting military installations in southern Syria, which were allegedly being repurposed by military personal, and becoming a potential threat to Israel. Military occupation forces entered several new villages of the Quneitra region. Besides the expansion of the military occupation, they launched airstrikes next to the Lebanese border, allegedly targeting Hezbollah militias. The Israeli air force also bombed the Palmyra military airport in central Syria in several raids.

# ANALYSIS: Read in comments

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HBDH Executive Committee: Comrade Baran Serhat Lives in Our United Revolutionary Struggle!

We sent off comrade Baran Serhat, one of the pioneers of our United Revolution, to immortality in a treacherous attack 6 years ago. Despite those who murdered him, comrade Baran Serhat continues to lead our United Revolution struggle. His successors are now proudly waving the glorious flag that he never let go of until his last breath, in the mountains, cities, prisons, squares, factories and schools of Turkey and Kurdistan, in the toughest trenches of the struggle. The dreams of those who think that they can end the struggle for revolution by massacring the revolutionaries are once again shattered. It is again the red road of the revolution that advances to victory despite all the difficult conditions and the all-out attacks of the fascist power. The sacrifice and effort of comrade Baran Serhat on this red road continues to guide us today, as it did yesterday. Comrade Baran Serhat devoted his life to the revolutionary struggle to carry our world, where exploitation and oppression prevail, to salvation and freedom. He became a creative leader by adapting the huge struggle experience he received from his predecessors to the conditions he was in. Wherever there was oppression and pain, he took his place at the forefront of the struggle of the peoples. The cities and prisons of Türkiye-Northern Kurdistan witnessed his many brave actions. He made the enemy kneel down with his upright stance, turning every place he was in into a fortress where the revolution was defended.

Comrade Baran Serhat was a master revolutionary who lived as he thought and brought theory to life with practice. He became both a brave warrior and a creative commander and leader of the struggle, positioned himself in accordance with whatever the need of the struggle was, and embraced his duties accordingly. He made intense efforts to develop the common struggle of the people by not recognizing the artificial borders created. He played important roles in protecting and advancing the Rojava Revolution and in expanding the internationalist struggle. He pioneered the establishment and development of our United Revolution movement and undertook historical duties. And in March, which witnessed many heroisms, resistances and also massacres, he fell to the ground in the attack of the fascist Turkish state and its gangs.

We are going through times when the flow of history has entered a sharp turn. We are in a process in which the contradictions and struggles between the rulers who drag the world towards a great destruction and the world’s peoples on the other side have become much sharper. Learning from the lives of the martyrs of the revolution and commemorating them is the most meaningful way to commemorate them, in conditions where revolutionary militancy, revolutionary values ​​and strong comradeship are as necessary as bread and water. Because they walked towards the enemy, never taking a step back from their struggle under the most difficult conditions, always moving forward, never hesitating for a moment, they became indomitable warriors of truth by embracing the consciousness of sacrifice. They instilled hope in the world and humanity, defying pessimism and indecision.

Those we send off to eternity in the struggle for revolution and socialism are the sources of resistance of our revolutionary war. They are monuments of resistance that show us what to do in the face of the unjust wars, occupations, oppression and torture, exploitation and massacres that continue today. We will increase the fight with the awareness that commemorating them is to develop the revolutionary struggle.

While we respectfully commemorate comrade Baran Serhat and all the monuments of resistance, we promise that we will walk more determinedly on the path they walked, that we will expand the united struggle, and that we will carry the struggle for revolution and socialism to victory. Let us raise the struggle for the United Revolution against imperialism, capitalism, fascism and male domination.

Comrade Baran Serhat Lives in Our Struggle in the Year of Immortality!
Martyr Namirin!
HBDH Executive Committee – 23 March 2025

https://abolitionmedia.noblogs.org/?p=17889

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# Signature of an agreement SDF - Provisional Government

On Monday, March 10, SDF commander Mazloum Abdi and Syrian President Ahmad al-Shar’a sign an agreement formalizing what was already discussed and confirming cooperation towards a shared security framework. It ensures Kurdish political rights and paves the way for integration of major institutions. DAANES institutions back the agreement gladly, hoping that it will put an end to the different conflicts like the clashes erupted on the coast, will safeguard rights of Kurds, and will enable the return of IDPs and refugees to Afrin and other occupied territories. In the following days, the UN and relevant international state actors, such as Gulf states, European states, and US welcomed the SDF-Syrian government agreement.

# Aftermatch of Coastal insurgence

After few days of coordinated insurgent attacks on the coastal region of Latakia, the stronghold of Assad loyalists, forces of the Ministry of Defense (MoD) are, more or less,in control of the situation. Several insurgents had been killed or arrested in wide security operations, as well as several fighters linked to the MoD, mostly caught in ambushes by the insurgents. Many civilians, mostly Alawite population, have been killed or forced to flee looking for shelter in the Russian military base. Security operations continue, combing the insurgent areas. Insurgent attacks, even if not in the scale that they had been, also continue. Interim president al-Shara made declaration briefly acknowledged accusations of extrajudicial killings by HTS-led forces and promised that those who “exceeded the powers of the state” will be held accountable. Shara also appointed two Alawites and several competent, professional judges to a committee to investigate the crimes committed by government troops.

# Provisional Constitution of Syria

Interim Syrian President Ahmed al-Shara signed a provisional constitution on March 13, claiming to initiate a five-year transition period. The document is based on Islamic jurisprudence, remarking that the president of Syria must be Muslim. The constitution defends the freedoms of opinion, expression, information, publication and press, also defends religious freedom. The Constitutional Committee emphasized that the document ensures a separation of powers between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. However, it ensures a lot of powers to the president, who will appoint a third of the "Peoples Assembly" and select a committee that will appoint the other two thirds. The president will also select the seven members of the Supreme Constitutional Court, also have right to declare state of emergency with the approval of the National Security Council, formed by the minsters of Defense, Interior, Intelligence and Foreign affairs. This grants al-Shara a massive influence over the formation and direction of the Syrian state. The SDC and other institutions of the DAANES, including the opposition party of ENKS, made declarations rejecting this constitution and denouncing how it perpetuates the presidential model of the Assad regime, not reflecting the plurality of Syria. Druze authorities also made declarations in the same direction.

# Turkey continue on the offensive

After the agreement between Mazlum Abdi and Ahmed al-Shara, there was a question of how much this implies the end of hostilities between SNA and SDF. But clearly nothing really changed on the ground. Turkey continued their attacks with planes and drones over the Eufrates region around Tishreen dam, were the civilian protests still ongoing. There have been renewed attacks with heavy weapons on differnet points of the M4 like Til Temir and Ain Issa frontlines. Turkish foreign minister made declarations declaring that will monitor closely the implementations of the agreements with SDF, calling to make no concessions for any attempt of self-administration.

# Continuing repatriations from Al-Hol camp to Iraq

After Iraq halted repatriations from Iraqi citizens in al-Hol camp for a short period, and following coordinated efforts between DANNES and the Iraqi state, more than 600 Iraqi former arrested had been allowed to return to Iraq. This also comes after The provisional government announced that they are ready to take control of the ISIS prisons currently under control of SDF.

# Points of agreement signed by SDF and the provisional government:

Political Participation – Full representation and rights for all Syrian communities, including Kurds, in state institutions based on merit rather than sectarian or ethnic background.
Kurdish Rights – Recognition of the Kurdish community as an integral part of Syria, ensuring constitutional rights and citizenship protections.
Security and Stability – A ceasefire across Syrian territories, aiming to reduce hostilities and facilitate political dialogue.
Institutional Integration – The merging of all civil and military institutions in northeast Syria into the national framework, including border crossings, airports, and energy resources.
Refugee Return – Guarantees for the safe return of displaced Syrians to their homes under government protection.
Sovereignty Protection – Joint efforts to counter external threats, including armed groups and foreign interventions that destabilize Syria.
Combating Extremism – Enhanced cooperation in counterterrorism efforts against ISIS and other extremist factions.
Ending Division and Sectarian Rhetoric – Rejecting hate speech and ensuring national reconciliation.

# Evaluation

The recent agreement between Mazlum Abdi and Ahmed al-Shara, happening at the same time than the massacres against Alawite population, leaves a bitter taste. The agreement brings nothing new, nothing more than what was already discussed. It is the formalization on paper to reach common agreements for Syria. It takes a step to make sure that no national-scale decisions and talks are made without people of northeastern Syria. Still, it is hard to see the future of the revolution through the large scale moves of state-level diplomacy.

At the same time, we need to ask ourselves: what would we like to see? What is the alternative? What could be done in this situation? Is there any better way to proceed, something that aligns better with anarchists values and respects the will and the needs of the people of north-east Syria? Honestly, these are very difficult questions.

We need to reflect what all this means. What it means for the people here, wearied by war, with the Turkish threats of a full scale invasion still looming? What it means for the revolution, with the collapse of the Assad regime but with a new authotitarian goverment rising over the same structures of nation-state? And also what it means for us, revolutionary anarchists who committed to support and defend this revolution?

In comparison with everything around it and beyond, NE Syria is clearly the most exciting political proposal in the region. Can it survive the war, the lack of resources, the attacks from all sides, the cooptation Can it avoid collapse and annihilation? Can people defend what they fought and died for, and live their lives in dignity? Time is desperately needed to ensure positive answers to these questions. And the moves we see in past weeks do buy the revolution some time. What we are trying to do here defies th logic of capitalist modernity, and this is not an easy thing to do. And as every revolution, whatever happens will bring lessons for the next ones to come.

Revolutionary greetings!
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Kurdish National Question “The Call of the Century”: Solution or Dissolution? – TKP-ML

First, a brief reminder is necessary. Following the “Al-Aqsa Flood Operation” carried out by the Palestinian National Resistance on October 7, 2023, the Middle East witnessed developments of historical significance. Israel launched military operations first against Gaza and then against Lebanon. Meanwhile, in Syria, the Ba’ath regime collapsed, and power was handed over to the Salafi- jihadist HTS gang.

Contradictions among capitalist-imperialist powers on the international stage escalated into open war with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the ongoing wars and conflicts in the Middle East. This situation is reshaping alliances and realignments among the imperialist-capitalist powers based on these contradictions. All sides are preparing for a new war of redivision (the Third Imperialist War of Division).

In the words of Chairman Mao, “there is chaos under the heavens.”

It is unthinkable that these developments would not affect the Turkish state and the ruling Turkish classes. Since its founding, Turkey has been a semi-colonial market for imperialism, and due to its geopolitical position, it has served as a “regional gendarme” for the imperialist powers, making this situation all the more inevitable.

While Turkey’s goals and objectives in Syria are well known, the emergence of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria—led by the Kurdish national movement and encompassing various nationalities and faiths, particularly the Arab nation—has become a critical factor. As this “autonomy” has increasingly gained the prospect of achieving an official status, the ruling Turkish classes have been compelled to develop a new policy on the Kurdish national question.

The Turkish state once again turned to Abdullah Öcalan, whom it has kept under severe isolation on İmralı Island for 26 years. Reports emerged that a process, which was not officially called a “solution process,” had been underway following meetings that apparently began about a year ago. As a result of this process, on February 27, the “İmralı Delegation” announced a call titled “Peace and Democratic Society,” personally written by Öcalan. After the written statement was read in both Kurdish and Turkish, delegation member Sırrı Süreyya Önder shared a note from Öcalan: “While presenting this perspective, it undoubtedly requires the abandonment of arms, the dissolution of the PKK, and the recognition of the legal and political framework for democratic politics.”

These developments have once again brought discussions centered on the Kurdish national question to the forefront. Naturally, the approaches of the “parties” to the process differ drastically. The Kurdish national movement embraced Abdullah Öcalan’s call and announced that guerrilla forces would lay down their arms. It was stated that the Kurdish national movement had no conditions regarding the process. As Sırrı Süreyya Önder from the “İmralı Delegation” put it: “There are no conditions for this. There is neither a precondition nor a condition afterward.” (March 3, 2025)

The stance of the Turkish state’s spokespeople on the process is well known, making it unnecessary to reiterate.

This is not the first time that the Turkish state and the Kurdish national movement have engaged in direct or indirect negotiations on the Kurdish national question. For instance, in 1993, under the initiatives of President Turgut Özal, PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan declared a unilateral ceasefire for the first time on March 20, 1993.

Following Öcalan’s capture on February 15, 1999, as a result of an international conspiracy, he called for another ceasefire, which the PKK declared in September 1999. Along with this, orders were given for the withdrawal of guerrilla forces from Turkish borders. The PKK largely complied with this call, initiating a period of “unilateral inaction” that lasted until 2004.

When the Turkish state failed to take any steps toward a “solution,” the PKK ended its unilateral ceasefire and resumed armed struggle on June 1, 2004. The AKP government launched the so-called “Democratic Initiative” process in 2009 under the name “National Unity and Brotherhood Project.” Talks with Abdullah Öcalan resumed on İmralı Island, and officials from the National Intelligence Organization (MİT) and some AKP representatives held secret meetings with PKK representatives (KCK executives) in Oslo, Europe. These meetings, known as the Oslo Talks, took place between 2009 and 2011.

In December 2012, then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan publicly announced that negotiations were taking place with Öcalan on İmralı. Following this statement, in early 2013, government representatives, led by the Undersecretary of MİT, held discussions with the “İmralı Delegation.” This period, which lasted from 2013 to 2015 and became known as the “solution process” in public discourse, saw the AKP government take legal steps to institutionalize the process. In 2014, a law was passed, the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM) established a “Solution Commission,” and the “Wise People Committee” was formed. On March 21, 2013, during the Newroz celebrations in Amed, Öcalan’s letter was read to the public. On February 28,

2015, the İmralı Delegation and representatives of the AKP government held a joint press conference at Dolmabahçe Palace. During this conference, Öcalan’s 10-point negotiation framework was read, and it was announced that Öcalan was calling on the PKK to convene an extraordinary congress in the spring to decide on disarmament. However, in March 2015, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan opposed the Dolmabahçe Agreement, stating that he had not given his approval and declaring, “I do not recognize the agreement.”

Toward the end of 2024, reports surfaced that a new “negotiation” process had taken place between the Turkish state and Abdullah Öcalan. This process was distinct from previous ones in that it was not officially labeled as a “process” and that the details of the meetings were not disclosed to the public. While the Kurdish national movement was reportedly not given any conditions or demands, the Turkish state, on the other hand, made no commitments or concessions. As a result, the nature of this process remains unknown. However, it must be emphasized that the Turkish state’s renewed engagement with Abdullah Öcalan regarding the Kurdish national question is significant. The primary reason for this is the developments unfolding in the Middle East, particularly in Syria. Therefore, it is essential to analyze the Turkish state’s new policy in this context.

Fortifying the “Internal Front”

It is understood that Israel’s aggression, the ongoing process in Syria, and overall developments in the Middle East have pushed the Turkish state toward developing a new policy. The signs of this policy began to appear a year ago. The first indication came when President and AKP Chairman Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated, “When we look at the events we are experiencing today, we can see much more clearly how crucial the internal front is for a nation.” (August 30, 2024). Later, in New York for the 79th United Nations General Assembly, Erdoğan reiterated this emphasis, declaring, “Our internal front objectives are our ‘Kızıl Elma’ (Red Apple).” (September 27, 2024).

Following Erdoğan, MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli also emphasized the “internal front,” stating, “Our primary duty is to fortify our national and spiritual front against a chaotic world. Our internal front, which is being shaken, and our unity and solidarity, which are being threatened with dissolution, cannot be ignored, and we will not allow it.” (October 2, 2024).

As a product of this new political strategy, the process began when MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli shook hands with the DEM Party Group in the Turkish Grand National Assembly on October 1, 2024. On the same day, Bahçeli stated, “We are entering a new era. While calling for peace in the world, we must also ensure peace within our own country.”

That same day, President and AKP Chairman Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, in his speech at the General Assembly, said, “It is now more than a necessity—it is an obligation—to realize that, in the face of Israeli aggression, it is not areas of conflict but areas of reconciliation that must come to the forefront both domestically and internationally.” As a further indication of this new political strategy, on October 22, 2024, Bahçeli declared at an MHP Group Meeting in Parliament, “If the isolation of the leader of the terrorists is lifted, let him come and speak at the DEM Party Group Meeting in Parliament. Let him declare that terrorism has ended completely, and that the organization has been dissolved.” Erdoğan also followed up with a statement: “We hope that the historic window of opportunity opened by the People’s Alliance will not be sacrificed for personal interests.” (October 22, 2024). Following these statements, the “İmralı Delegation” published Abdullah Öcalan’s statement, titled “Peace and Democratic Society,” marking the 26th year of his imprisonment by the Turkish state. As indicated above, although this call was written by Öcalan himself, it appears to be essentially a product of negotiations conducted over the past year between Turkish state officials and Öcalan, ultimately resulting in a certain agreement. Since no official explanation has been provided to the public regarding the nature of these talks or the “agreement” reached, making a concrete assessment is difficult. However, it is understood that in return for the PKK laying down arms and dissolving itself, certain measures have been taken by the Turkish state.

According to publicly available information, negotiations and discussions between the Turkish state and Abdullah Öcalan have been ongoing for the past year. It appears that the Turkish state has conducted this process with Öcalan, whom it has held captive—an inherently problematic and fundamentally unjust situation. Under these conditions, it is necessary to speak of “secret diplomacy.” This, in turn, limits the ability to make an objective assessment of the matter.

Is Öcalan’s Call a Surrender?

First and foremost, it should be noted that it is not unusual for warring parties to engage in negotiations with their enemies, go through “peace processes,” or enter into mutual or unilateral ceasefires. Throughout history, communists and leaders of various national and social liberation movements have taken similar practical steps. These steps must be considered tactical maneuvers serving the goal of revolution and liberation, as long as that goal is not abandoned.

Although Öcalan’s call on February 27, which includes the dissolution of the PKK, signifies a significant political break, it should not be forgotten that this is not the first time he has made such a call. Indeed, Öcalan has previously stated in various declarations and writings that, due to the setbacks experienced in socialism and the collapse of modern revisionist regimes (what Öcalan calls the “collapse of real socialism”), a change in line (which he refers to as a “paradigm shift”) was necessary and that new organizational methods and models should be adopted.

The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) initially emerged as a national movement influenced by Marxism, waging a revolutionary war against the Turkish ruling classes’ policies of national denial and extermination. However, in his statements and defenses following his imprisonment, Öcalan renounced the “Right to Freely Secede” meaning the demand to establish a separate state. Instead, he led the Kurdish National Movement toward what he conceptualized as “Democratic Modernity,” characterized by an “Ecological, Women’s Liberationist, and Democratic Nation Paradigm.”

Öcalan, in his statements and defenses, defined his ideological shift as a “break from real socialism” and distanced himself from the revolutionary-socialist ideas that influenced the founding of the PKK. Instead, he introduced various alternative models, including ecological theories, “post-Marxist” currents, and anarchist tendencies, as a “new organizational model” for the Kurdish National Movement. In this sense, there is nothing truly “new” in Öcalan’s latest declaration.

However, as seen in the recent statement, it appears that even this “paradigm” has now been abandoned. Notably, Öcalan explicitly described the PKK, the organization he led in its foundation, as suffering from “lack of meaning and excessive repetition.” While this remark signifies an important political rupture, it should also be understood as a call to the practical leadership of the Kurdish National Movement to “update its meaning.” In this sense, it would be inaccurate to interpret Öcalan’s position as one of “surrender.” Given his ideological stance, political maneuvering, and pragmatism as a representative of a national movement, this becomes even more significant. Therefore, reducing the issue merely to “liquidationism,” “surrender,” or even “betrayal” would be misleading. It must not be forgotten that the Kurdish nation had rebelled even before the PKK and, with the PKK, sustained its rebellion through a long-term guerrilla war. A national struggle that has endured oppression, bans on its existence and language, and massacres cannot simply be summed up as “surrender” at this stage. Moreover, the Kurdish national question is not confined to Turkey’s Kurdistan alone; it continues to exist in various forms across different parts of Kurdistan.

At this point, the Kurdish national question has surpassed Öcalan’s “paradigm” time and again. The reactions to his statement have further placed the Kurdish nation and the reality of Kurdistan on the global agenda. The primary figure responsible for this situation is none other than Öcalan himself, who has been held in severe isolation on an island for 26 years. Despite all its weaknesses and shortcomings, the uninterrupted struggle of the Kurdish nation, and above all, its armed resistance, has been the determining factor. Even in its current state, the Kurdish National Movement, which began in Turkey’s Kurdistan and later expanded to Iraq, Syria, and Iran’s Kurdistan, has become a subject of not only the Middle East but also global political discourse. This has undoubtedly been shaped by the PKK’s practical leadership and the Kurdish people’s elevation of Öcalan to a symbolic position of “national leadership,” even if not in direct practice.

For this reason, it is problematic to assess the situation based on the premise that, under Öcalan’s leadership, the Kurdish National Movement has surrendered through negotiation and is set to be dissolved, thereby imposing liquidation on the revolutionary movement as a whole. Evaluating the matter solely through this possibility is fundamentally an ideological and political line issue. The Kurdish national question remains one of the primary contradictions in our region. Its resolution, whether through this or that means, or the reduction of its intensity and urgency does not necessarily mean that other contradictions in our region, or indeed the principal contradiction, will also be resolved.

Those who base their entire analysis and critique purely on “surrender” and “liquidation” expose their own ideological and political insecurity. More importantly, they reveal their tendency to link the entire revolutionary process exclusively to the struggle of the oppressed nation, disregarding the broader class struggle.

Like any national movement, the Kurdish National Movement can, of course, reach agreements and compromises with the enemy it fights against. This possibility has existed since the moment the national movement emerged, and at certain stages of the war, it is understandable for the movement to acknowledge and highlight this possibility as a tactical consideration. However, continuously focusing on this possibility as the primary issue reflects a problematic approach. What must remain uncompromising are not possibilities but principles. It is essential to be unwavering in principles while maintaining flexibility in formulating policies according to concrete conditions.

Principle: The Right to Freely Secede

First and foremost, it is problematic that a fundamental right such as the Right to Freely Secede, which arises from the very existence of an oppressed nation, is being renounced, especially when this renunciation is expressed by a single individual (Öcalan) under conditions of captivity. Furthermore, criminalizing the legitimate and just foundation upon which the struggle of the oppressed nation stands, while proposing a compromise (or agreement) with the ruling- class bourgeoisie of the oppressor nation, does not change the reality that the Kurdish nation in Turkey remains an oppressed nation.

Another problematic aspect of Öcalan’s statement is his emphasis on the so- called “shared destiny of Turks and Kurds.” This rhetoric is frequently used by the representatives of the oppressor nation. Phrases like “brotherhood” and “we are like flesh and bone” serve only to obscure and legitimize the oppression exerted by the dominant nation over the oppressed one. True fraternity between nations can only be discussed once full national equality is recognized. Therefore, the real issue is not about renewing and strengthening a so-called “Turkish-Kurdish alliance” but rather about putting an end to the historical injustices imposed on the Kurdish nation.

The Kurds in Turkey exist as a nation and are subjected to national oppression by the dominant nation. Changes in the form or methods of this oppression— whether its intensity increases or decreases—do not negate the fact that the Kurds are a nation. Nor does it invalidate their legitimate and just democratic demands, above all, their Right to Freely Secede, which stems from their status as a nation.

In general, the national question, and specifically the Kurdish national question, is ultimately a matter of rights and status. As the term itself suggests, it is not solely a problem to be resolved on a class basis. While its ultimate resolution is tied to class struggle, this does not prevent it from producing various intermediate “solutions” along the way. In the era of imperialism and proletarian revolutions, some national questions have, in one way or another, been “resolved” through imperialist intervention.

The demand for statehood, which is at the core of the national question in terms of securing national rights and establishing an independent economic space, can take different forms. It may evolve into arrangements such as autonomy or federation, as seen in various historical examples. Indeed, the establishment of collective cultural rights, political status, and organizational structures, particularly concerning language, constitutes an advanced stage from the perspective of national criteria. In this sense, it represents a shift in status. Furthermore, these demands are the democratic demands of the oppressed national bourgeoisie against the ruling-class bourgeoisie of the oppressor nation. The possibility that these demands may be instrumentalized by imperialism or co-opted for other interests does not invalidate their democratic content. In our specific case, the solution to the Kurdish national question lies in the fulfillment of the Kurdish nation’s national-collective rights, including the right to secede, federation, autonomy, and cultural rights. Renouncing or refusing to demand these national-collective rights does not mean that the Kurdish national question has been resolved, nor does it indicate that the contradiction between the oppressor and oppressed nations has disappeared.

For this reason, in Öcalan’s “Call for Peace and Democratic Society,” he states that “the inevitable consequence of an excessively nationalist drift, such as the creation of a separate nation-state, federation, administrative autonomy, and culturalist solutions, fails to provide an answer to the sociology of historical society.” While this statement points to a deadlock in solving the national question, it also implicitly accepts the Turkish nation’s privilege of statehood while rejecting, even in the bourgeois-democratic sense, the Kurdish nation’s right to establish an independent state, which stems from its status as a nation. Such a view is, of course, unacceptable to communists.

In Turkey, the Kurdish national question remains unresolved. It continues with all its intensity. Contrary to Öcalan’s claims, the issue of the Kurdish nation’s national rights in Turkey persists.

Has the Era of Armed Struggle Ended?

On the other hand, it is necessary to point out the following reality: when it comes to resolving the Kurdish national question, caution is needed against narratives that can be formulated as “laying down arms and opening the political channel” narratives that have also found resonance within the ranks of the Kurdish movement. While it is understandable for those on the side of the oppressor nation to promote such narratives, they hold no real value for the proletariat and the oppressed peoples of the world. After all, “if a people have no army, they have nothing!” This is another principle.

Of course, “democratic political struggle instead of armed struggle” is a choice. However, whether the conditions exist for such a choice is decisive. Under current circumstances in Turkey, leaving aside the well-known obstacles to “democratic political struggle,” even the slightest crumbs of bourgeois democracy are no longer tolerated. In Turkey, the conditions for “democratic politics” have always existed on paper, but in practice, they have no real foundation. Fascism is not simply a form of government; it is the very mode of governance and the essence of politics itself. For this reason, even the slightest demand for rights or any democratic and revolutionary struggle is met with fascist terror. In the recent period, under the so-called “Presidential System,” the AKP-MHP fascism has imposed a policy of fascist repression against all democratic demands, including freedom of expression. One of those who have experienced this reality most acutely is the Kurdish national.

It must not be forgotten that the Kurdish National Movement resorted to armed struggle because there was no path for democratic struggle, as denial and annihilation were imposed upon it. This was not merely a choice but a necessity under the conditions of Turkey and Turkish Kurdistan. There have been Kurdish national movements that did not take up arms, yet they too could not escape the heavy repression of fascism. This reality, just as it was in the past, remains valid today. The presence of certain changes does not mean that fascism has been eliminated or that contradictions, particularly the Kurdish national question, have been resolved.

On the other hand, the propaganda that equates armed struggle with a lack of political strategy under the guise of “solution” and “peace” is fundamentally flawed. Armed struggle is, in itself, a form of politics. For years, those who have made political arguments under the pretense of criticizing armed struggle, despite acknowledging the justified assertion of “the role of force in Kurdistan,” cannot erase the fact that armed struggle is also a political struggle.

The search for reconciliation with fascism leads to unfounded theories such as “armed struggle is not political struggle” and even that “armed struggle hinders democratic struggle.” As practice has consistently demonstrated, “War is the continuation of politics by other means.” The rejection of this reality by its practitioner’s points to their ideological stance and their current decision to conduct politics through different means.

Moreover, the assertion that “the era of armed struggle has ended” can only be a dream in today’s conditions, where preparations for a new imperialist war of division are underway, especially in the Middle East. Furthermore, the process has repeatedly invalidated Öcalan’s statement that “the era of armed struggle has ended.” For instance, while Öcalan made this declaration in 2013, at the same time, the Kurdish nation was achieving successes through a life-and-death armed struggle against ISIS in Rojava. Additionally, it is evident that currently, in Rojava, there is no other option but to respond with armed resistance to the direct attacks of Turkey and its proxy groups. As these realities have consistently proven, not only has “the era of armed struggle” not ended, but especially under Middle Eastern conditions, it is clear that it remains a necessity. Truths are revolutionary, and the era of armed struggle has not ended. In the current situation of the imperialist capitalist system, with signs of a new war of division emerging, and in today’s reality where the world is increasingly arming itself under the guise of “defense,” theories suggesting that the era of armed struggle has ended for the proletariat, oppressed peoples, and nations of the world are, in the broadest sense, equivalent to disarming the oppressed and are, of course, unacceptable.

Is a “Democratic Society” Possible Under Conditions of Fascism?

In his statement, Abdullah Öcalan discusses Turkish-Kurdish relations, speaks of a “spirit of brotherhood,” and proposes “democratic society” and “democratic reconciliation” as the fundamental methods for a solution. However, under capitalism, there is no democracy that is independent of or above class structures. Every class has its own understanding of democracy and implements it accordingly. Therefore, a “democratic society” or “democracy” cannot truly be realized within a capitalist system dominated by the bourgeoisie. Real people’s democracy and a democratic society can only exist under a people’s state, where the people hold power.

Expecting a “democratic society” from the Turkish state is an illusion. The fundamental approach is flawed from the outset. Even as the call for a “democratic society” is made, the reality remains that the process is being carried out behind closed doors. Without a comprehensive public explanation of what is happening, even the possibility of a “democratic discussion” is out of the question. Moreover, one of the parties involved is under severe isolation. Before anything else, the heavy isolation imposed on Öcalan must be lifted, and he must be freed. If the goal is truly a democratic society, then at the very least, Öcalan must be provided with the conditions to work freely and be allowed unrestricted communication with his organization.

Öcalan justifies his call for the dissolution of the PKK and the laying down of arms by arguing that in Turkey, “the denial of identity has been resolved” and “progress has been made in freedom of expression.” However, it is evident to all that no fundamental progress has actually been made in these areas. The so- called “recognition” of the existence of Kurds is, at best, a superficial acknowledgment. Even this limited recognition was only achieved through a struggle that cost countless lives. Therefore, it is clear that this does not correspond to any concrete status in terms of resolving the national question. Moreover, at this stage, the situation regarding freedom of expression is so stark that it leaves no room for debate.

The point that A. Öcalan overlooks or rather misjudges because he fails to approach the issue from a class perspective — is the root of the national question in general, and the Kurdish national question in particular. The Kurdish national question cannot be reduced to issues of identity denial and freedom of expression, nor is the Kurdish nation itself the source of this problem. The problem lies in the national oppression imposed on the Kurdish nation. This oppression is not only directed at the Kurdish people in general but affects the entire Kurdish nation—except for a handful of large feudal landlords and a few big bourgeois figures who have fully integrated with the Turkish ruling classes. Kurdish workers, peasants, the urban petty bourgeoisie, and small landowners all continue to suffer from national oppression. As a result of the Kurdish nation’s struggle, certain concessions have been made in the national oppression policy of the dominant nation, yet the policy of national oppression continues uninterrupted. The Kurdish national question remains unresolved. In our region, resolving the Kurdish national question remains one of the tasks of the People’s Democratic Revolution. Under conditions of fascism, it is impossible to achieve a revolutionary resolution of the Kurdish national question. However, as a result of revolutionary-democratic struggle, certain steps may be taken. Supporting progressive steps that contribute to resolving the Kurdish national question and other major contradictions in Turkey and Turkish Kurdistan, while integrating these reforms into the revolutionary struggle, is not incorrect.

However, propagating reforms as a solution, and even more so, claiming that under current conditions the Kurdish nation has exercised its right to self- determination, is entirely misleading. Öcalan, in his statement, argues that “there is no non-democratic path for system-building and implementation. There cannot be. Democratic reconciliation is the fundamental method.” In today’s world, within the reality of class society, this view is fundamentally flawed. Within the reality of class divisions, the concept of democracy is also class- based.The imperialist capitalist world order, which is built upon the system of private property, and the reality of the state in Turkey and Turkish Kurdistan, prove that the state is nothing more than “an instrument of one class’s oppression over another.” Even bourgeois democracies have become increasingly questionable under current conditions.

From its very foundation, bourgeois democracy in Turkey and Turkish Kurdistan has had a fascist character. “Our country has never truly experienced real bourgeois democracy; it has only tasted some of its crumbs.” (İK, Collected Works, Nisan Yayımcılık).

Thus, setting aside other contradictions, the emergence of the Kurdish national question and the policy of national oppression imposed on the Kurdish nation have been carried out under the guise of “democracy.”

The emancipation, freedom, and independence of the Turkish working class, the laboring people, and the Kurdish nation cannot be achieved within the system or through its so-called democracy. The struggle for liberation of the peoples from the Turkish and Kurdish nations, as well as various other nationalities and faiths, does not depend on “democratic reconciliation” but rather necessitates methods and tools of struggle outside the system.This is not a matter of choice but a historical necessity.

TC (Turkish Republic) Fascism Must Be Targeted!

At this stage, the Turkish state, which once labeled Öcalan as a “terrorist leader,” now presents him as a figure advocating peace and seeking a solution. Although the state’s media propaganda will frame this process as the “elimination of terrorism,” at the same time, discussions will emerge both domestically and internationally about the obligations of the Turkish state, democratization, and the steps it must take.

Indeed, in the note conveyed to the public by Sırrı Süreyya Önder—though absent from Öcalan’s official statement (likely because the Turkish state did not permit it to be included), Öcalan outlines what the Turkish state must do in return for the “agreement” reached. He points to legal and constitutional changes that would secure the political rights of the Kurdish nation, emphasizing that the process of disarmament and the dissolution of the PKK should be synchronized with democratic legal reforms within the country. These demands, within the conditions of fascism, are undeniably “progressive” and “democratic.” Whether they will be implemented is another matter entirely.

Regardless of the calculations of Turkish fascism, these demands must be supported and defended.

In general, regarding the national question, and specifically the Kurdish national question, the class-conscious proletariat holds a clear stance. It is worth reiterating:

“..Regardless of nationality, the class-conscious Turkish proletariat will unconditionally and unequivocally support the general democratic content of

the Kurdish national movement that targets the oppression, tyranny, and privileges of the Turkish ruling classes, seeks to abolish all forms of national oppression, and aims for the equality of nations. It will likewise unconditionally and unequivocally support the movements of other oppressed nationalities in the same direction.

…Regardless of nationality, the class-conscious Turkish proletariat will remain entirely neutral in the struggles waged by the bourgeoisie and landlords of various nationalities for their own superiority and privileges. The class- conscious Turkish proletariat will never support tendencies within the Kurdish national movement that seek to strengthen Kurdish nationalism; it will never assist bourgeois nationalism; it will never support the struggles of Kurdish bourgeoisie and landlords to secure their own privileges and superiority. That is to say, it will support only the general democratic content within the Kurdish national movement and will not go beyond that.” (İbrahim Kaypakkaya, Collected Works, p.194)

In conclusion, a new process has begun in the context of the Kurdish national question with Abdullah Öcalan’s call. The distinguishing factor of this process compared to previous ones is the new political orientation implemented by the Turkish comprador bourgeoisie under the discourse of “consolidating the internal front.”

For this reason, it must be recognized that this process carries risks not only for the Kurdish National Movement but also for TC fascism. The equation of solution or dissolution is not solely an issue for the Kurdish National Movement but is also a matter of concern for the Turkish state itself.

The fundamental issue here is that the “sharp edge of the arrow” must not be directed at the Kurdish National Movement or Abdullah Öcalan, but at Turkish fascism. The creator and cause of the Kurdish national question is TC fascism, the fascist dictatorship of the Turkish comprador bourgeoisie.

The TC fascism is in a state of crisis. As a result of this crisis, it is seeking “reconciliation” with the Kurdish National Movement. Under these conditions, it is necessary to stand in solidarity with the Kurdish National Movement.

Criticism, of course, is possible and even necessary. However, the primary enemy must not be overlooked, the focus must remain on the revolutionary struggle of the peoples of Turkey, including the Turkish and Kurdish nations, as well as various nationalities and religious communities.

Whether the “Call of the Century” will lead to a solution or dissolution will ultimately be determined by the unfolding process and the struggle itself. This necessitates that the revolutionary democratic opposition does not remain indifferent but actively intervenes in the process.

Referring the solution of the Kurdish national question to revolution under the guise of a “real solution”, invoking the Right to Freely Secede while overlooking the current dynamics of the issue means falling out of touch with the political reality of the present moment. Such an approach is unacceptable from the perspective of the interests of the People’s Democratic Revolution in Turkey. The issue must not be reduced merely to a question of power but must be grasped with ideological clarity.

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